Too Many Geniuses
The American Way
title: Cut to the Chase
Setting: Boeing corporate conference room. Sleek glass walls, fake ferns, and a glowing screen displaying:
"Q3 Cost-Savings Review – Aircraft Program Delta"
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Characters:
- JANET – VP of Marketing. Polished, sharp, driven by numbers and PR.
- CARLOS – Lead Aeronautical Engineer. Serious, principled, visibly tired.
- MEI – Systems Safety Engineer. Brilliant, sarcastic, loyal to science.
- RALPH – Finance Analyst. Spreadsheet logic, chases ROI.
- TINA – Marketing intern. New, excited, not yet jaded.
- JOE – Veteran engineer. Quiet, observant. Speaks when it matters.
[Lights up. Everyone is seated around a modern conference table. A slide on screen reads "Unit Cost Delta vs. Airbus A320neo – 9.4% Over."]
JANET
Let’s get to it. Sales says we’re losing contracts. The board says we’re bloated. I say we need to cut. So—ideas. Clean ones. Nothing that shows blood on the tarmac.
RALPH
(Scrolling through tablet)
We’ve analyzed cabin costs. Swapping out aluminum seat frames for carbon-reinforced polymer saves $80 per unit.
MEI
And cracks under thermal stress. Let’s not save pennies to melt fuselages.
TINA
We could do away with magazine racks! Everyone has a phone now.
CARLOS
(Without looking up)
Weight saved: three pounds. Risk introduced: a cabin full of loose projectiles during turbulence.
JANET
Alright, not cabin fluff. Let’s dig. Structural? Avionics? Software?
RALPH
There’s a low-cost Malaysian vendor offering nav packages 22% cheaper.
CARLOS
And 60% less reliable. Their demo units failed three FAA tests.
JANET
Can we push a partial suite? Less functionality for short-haul flights?
MEI
Sure. Call it “Blindfold Mode.”
TINA
What about those self-cleaning lavs? They’re like, $200K per unit. Couldn’t we just… trust people to wipe?
MEI
We’ve tried that. Spoiler: they don’t.
CARLOS
How about cutting those biometric boarding sensors? Those aren’t flight-critical.
JANET
TikTok loves them. They're staying.
RALPH
(Flipping slides)
What if we shift maintenance alerts from real-time to daily sync?
CARLOS
So we only know something’s wrong after the plane lands—or doesn’t.
JANET
Okay, Carlos. I’m asking you, engineer-to-marketing. What’s technically optional?
CARLOS
(After long pause, stands)
Angle of attack indicators. We have three. Some planes fly with one.
MEI
(Snaps her head up)
Not ours. Not after what happened.
JANET
You’re saying we don’t need all three?
CARLOS
I’m saying we shouldn’t lose them—but technically, you could. Just pray your one doesn't ice over or short out.
TINA
So... if it fails, then what?
MEI
Then the flight computer doesn’t know which way is up. Literally.
JANET
Could software smooth it out?
CARLOS
You mean like MCAS?
[Silence. Everyone knows the word.]
MEI
MCAS took 346 lives because of a single bad sensor. No redundancy. No override.
JANET
What about pitot tubes?
CARLOS
Do you want to know how fast you're flying? Or just hope?
TINA
But we could market it as... I don’t know, “optimized simplicity”?
RALPH
“Streamlined Performance Model.” Base price drops by $1.4 million.
MEI
And what’s the cost when it goes wrong?
RALPH
That’s what insurance is for.
CARLOS
No, Ralph. That’s what coffins are for.
JANET
(Softening)
Okay. What if we offer a tiered safety package? Full suite standard on long-haul. Slimmed avionics for regional carriers.
MEI
Safety as an add-on?
JOE
(From the back, finally speaking)
Why don’t we just do it right... and work out the rest later?
[Silence. The whole room turns to him.]
CARLOS
(Quietly)
Now that’s engineering.
JANET
(Sits back)
What do passengers actually need?
CARLOS
(Deadpan)
Apparently... hope.
[The screen updates: “Savings Options Summary.” Below, a line reads: “AOA Redundancy – Removable. Risk Category: TBD.”]
[Lights dim.]
Historical Note:
Between October 2018 and March 2019, two Boeing 737 MAX aircraft—Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302—crashed, killing 346 people.
Both incidents were tied to the aircraft’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which depended on a single angle of attack sensor. In both cases, faulty sensor data triggered MCAS to pitch the aircraft downward, overriding pilot input.
The lack of redundancy and insufficient pilot training were cited as key failures.
Boeing’s subsequent grounding, investigations, and financial and reputational damage reshaped industry safety standards—and its future.
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